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CORPORATE-NONPROFIT PARTNERSHIPS:
VARIETIES AND COVARIATES
MICHELLE SINCLAIR" & JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ"
I. INTRODUCTION

On May 16, 1996, President Bill Clinton sponsored a roundtable
discussion on corporate social responsibility. The roundtable included
over one hundred of the most influential business leaders in the United
States meeting to promote good business practices. The president's
message to these corporate executives was that "you can do the right thing
and make money."'
Clinton's statement that you can do "the right thing" and make a profit
has been widely debated among academics. 2 Studies focusing on corporate
philanthropy, a form of corporate social responsibility, attempted to
measure whether companies that "do good" by giving to charity are either
better or worse off in terms of profitability and growth.3 Yet despite these
*

Graduate Student, University of Minnesota.

Professor of Sociology and Strategic Management and Organization, University
of Minnesota.
1. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Prods Executives to 'Do the Right Thing', N.Y. TIMEs,
May 17, 1996, at Dl.
2. See generally Peter Arlow & Martin J. Gannon, Social Responsiveness, Corporate
**

Structure, and Economic Performance, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 235 (1982) (arguing that

economic performance is not related to social responsibility in a positive, negative, or
neutral manner); Philip L. Cochran & Robert A. Wood, CorporateSocial Responsibility
and Financial Performance, 27 AcAD. MGMT. J. 42 (1984) (using improved financial

performance variables to find a correlation between corporate social responsibility and
financial performance); Louis W. Fry et al., Corporate Contributions:Altruistic or ForProfit?, 25 AcAD. MGMT. J. 94 (1982) (examining the profit motivation argument to find

a relationship between profit considerations and corporate giving); Katherine Maddox
McElroy & John J. Siegfried, The Community Influence on Corporate Contributions, 14
PUB. FIN. Q. 394 (1986) (developing a model of corporate behavior where highly
profitable companies contribute to mostly local philanthropic organizations); Frederick D.
Sturdivant & James L. Ginter, Corporate Social Responsiveness: ManagementAttitudes
and Economic Performance, 19 CAL. MGMT. Rsv. 30 (1977) (finding a positive
correlation between perceived corporate social responsiveness and long-run profitability);
Charles P. Cochran, Corporate Philanthropy: Attitudes of Institutional Shareholders and
Corporate Philanthropy Executives (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Minnesota) (on file with author).
3. See, e.g., Arlow & Gannon, supranote 2, at 235; Cochran & Wood, supra note
2, at 42; Fry et al., supra note 2, at 94; McElroy & Siegfried supra note 2, at 394;
Sturdivant & Ginter supra note 2, at 30; Cochran supra note 2.
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studies, evidence remains inconclusive. 4 Most conclude that "[b]eing
socially involved does not appear to increase investors' total rate of return.
Nor does it appear that being socially involved is dysfunctional for the
investor. "'
Clearly the profit motive is not the only factor driving corporate
contributions, and one could conjecture that firms give either to advance
public welfare or managerial utility. In the first case they behave like notfor-profits or governments. They identify needs in the larger society and
undertake initiatives to solve community problems. From an institutional
perspective it is not difficult to understand why firms make contributions
"to do good." From Sharfman's institutional history of corporate
philanthropy and Kahn's description of current corporate and tax laws, it
is clear that companies face conflicting demands. 6 On one hand, they are
told that, as agents of capital, they have a fiduciary responsibility to
optimize return on shareholder equity; on the other, they are told that, as
social institutions, they have a responsibility to look after the well being
of the larger community and that gifts, which are charitable, should not
benefit the firm directly.7
In the second case contributions are a form of executive perquisite.
Adopting Williamson's model of discretionary behavior we might imagine
that some managers prefer corporate contributions as well as after-tax
profits. 8 The former might provide such private benefits as support for
their favorite charities or access to elite social circles.9 Atkinson,
Galaskiewicz, Wang, and Coffey have extended this argument suggesting
that managerial utility is more likely under conditions of weak
owner/principal monitoring. 0 Given that contributions are so weakly
4. See Arlow & Gannon, supra note 2, at 235.
5. Walter F. Abbott & R. Joseph Monsen, On the Measurement of Corporate Social
Responsibility: Self-Reported Disclosures as a method of Measuring CorporateSocial
Involvement, 22 ACAD. MGMT. J.501, 514 (1979).
6. See Mark Sharfman, Changing Institutional Rules: The Evolution of Corporate
Philanthropy, 1883-1953, 33 Bus. & Soc'Y 236, 256-64 (1994); see also, Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Pandora'sBox: ManagerialDiscretion and the Problem of Corporate
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997).

7. See Peter Navarro, Why do Corporations Give to Charity? 61 J. Bus. 65, 66
(1988).
8. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR:
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964).

9. See Sturdivant & Ginter, supra note 2, at 30 (assuming that corporate giving
reflects the attitudes of managers).
10. See Lisa Atkinson & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Stock Ownership and Company
Contributions to Charity, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 86 (1988) (suggesting that the more
diffuse the stock ownership, the greater the corporate contributions); Jia Wang & Betty
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coupled to performance, it is unlikely that owner-managers will contribute
much to charity. With the separation of ownership and control, managers
are free to use company profits to further their own private interests."
The literature on corporate philanthropy shows that companies transfer
money to the charitable sector in a variety of ways. After a brief review
of the philosophical debate, we offer a typology of corporate giving
varieties.
Company giving can be typed along two dimensions:
exclusivity and meterability of benefits.' 2 To the extent that company
giving results in exclusive, measurable benefits for the firm, it is faithful
to its agency responsibilities. If company giving benefits many different
actors in the environment-including competitors, in many and diffuse
ways-it could be faithful to its social responsibility mandate, but it could
also be serving managerial utility. 3 However, the choice of variety
depends not upon philosophical preference but upon context. This paper
focuses on profits, market position, ownership, and social context. While
the description of the different varieties of corporate philanthropy draws
heavily on case studies, the discussion of contextual effects draws on large
sample surveys of company giving behavior.
II. THE CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY DEBATE

While most agree that the New Jersey court ruling in A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 4 in 1953, merely legitimated what many

in the United States had come to expect of business corporations, it still
was a landmark decision.' 5 In A .P. Smith, the court ruled that corporate
managers now had the broad discretion and judgment to decide what would
best promote a corporation's interest.' 6 Previously, the law required that
S. Coffey, Board Composition and Corporate Philanthropy, 11 J. Bus. ETHIcS 771, 774
(1992) (suggesting that the ratio of insiders to outsiders on boards will be positively
related to contributions).
11. See Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, supra note 10, at 83.
12. See infra text at pp. 1066-67.
13. See infra text at pp. 1066-67.
14. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
15. See id.; Sharfman, supra note 6 (noting that this decision, and the U.S. Supreme
Court's refusal to review it, affirmed the corporation's right to make donations by setting
aside the bar imposed by the ultra vires doctrine).
16. See 98 A.2d at 590 (stating that "in our view the corporate power to make
reasonable charitable contributions exists under modem conditions, even apart from
express statutory provision, its enactments simply constitute helpful and confirmatory
declarations of such power, accompanied by limiting safeguards").
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corporate contributions have a direct relation to the company's business. 7
Now corporations had a responsibility not only to their shareholders but
to the larger community. 8 This larger community included employees, the
communities in which they do business, and the natural environment.' 9
Although this helped to end doubts and uncertainties among company
donors and opened the door for a marked expansion of contributions, it
also raised many new questions about what "responsibility to the larger
community" actually meant.
Although the legality of charitable contributions is not an issue, the
philosophical debate continues. Some argue that it is unethical for
businesses to give, while others say that it is unethical for businesses not
to give. Representing the former side, Milton Friedman argues that the
business of business is business:
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate
officials . . . have a "social responsibility" that goes beyond serving
the interest of their stockholders .... Few trends could so thoroughly
undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their
stockholders as possible .... Can [corporate executives] decide how
great a burden they are justified in placing on themselves or their
stockholders to serve that social interest? 20
Friedman believes that a company has primary responsibility to its
shareholders, and thus managers and employees must do whatever is
legally permissible to increase revenues and reduce costs. If charitable
contributions do neither, then they are inappropriate. If executives or
shareholders want to help social causes they can give their money
individually. 2'
A recent reincarnation of the Friedman position is in the redefinition
of corporate donations as social investments. Craig Smith believes that
partnerships which directly further corporate initiatives are both necessary
and important.22 Aligning the interest of the company with the "larger
17. See Sharfman, supranote 6, at 236.
18. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co., 98 A.2d at 581.
19. See Edward J. Stendardi, Jr., Corporate Philanthropy: The Redefinition of
Enlightened Self-Interest, 29 Soc. SCI. J. 21, 22 (1992).
20. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1962).
21. See id.
22. See Craig Smith, The New CorporatePhilanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., May-

June 1994, at 105 (explaining how companies are now forming strategic partnerships
with nonprofit organizations to advance their business goals while affecting social
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good" is the way to achieve the long term goals of a company, but
companies need to keep in mind what they get out of the transaction as
well. Giving as an investment is closely connected to the idea that
companies can measure the return to their philanthropic activity.'
Dienhart states that equating donations with investments is not only
compatible but complimentary to everyday business activities. 4 It is also
an effective way to convince those making the decisions that giving is not
a high risk activity, because there will be some measurable return75
Defenders of charitable contributions counter that firms have a
responsibility to all their stakeholders, not just investors. Stakeholders
include investors, but also include employees, customers, the community,
and the natural environment in which firms operate.26
A corporation is an integral part of our society and as such it should
be a responsible and responsive member of society. By virtue of its
role as a producer of products, employer of people, and generator of
funds, it has a unique capacity to provide benefits for the public good
on a large and pervasive scale. Accordingly, the corporation should
utilize its resources to respond to the challenge to improve our
society.2 7
In the extreme, firms, just as other citizens, have a moral obligation to
advance public welfare. 28 But on top of that, firms need to ensure the well
change).
23. See Stendardi, supra note 19, at 25.
24. See John W. Dienhart, CharitableInvestments: A Strategy for Improving the
Business Environment, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 63, 64-65 (1988) (conceptualizing a view of
corporate giving where self-interested investment is indeed altruistic because it improves
the economic climate in which businesses operate).
25. See id.
26. See R.

EDWARD

FREEMAN,

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT.

A

STAKEHOLDER

APPROACH 24-25 (Edwin M. Epstein ed., 1984) (framing a broad model of the firm
which defines stakeholders as all groups that can affect, or be affected by, the firm's
business); William E. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A StakeholderTheory of the Modem
Corporation:Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 97-106 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 3rd ed. 1988) (defining stakeholders as groups
who have a stake in the firm, to whom managers owe a fiduciary duty).
27. See JAMES F. HARRiS & ANNE KLEPPER, CORPORATE PHILANTHROPIC PUBLIC
SERVICE ACTIvITIEs 17-18 (The Conference Board 1976).
28. See Bill Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A Moral Basisfor CorporatePhilanthropy,
12 J. Bus. ETHICS 745, 746 (1993) (The authors espouse the view of J.S. Mill that it is
"better to be a Socrates dissatisfied, than a pig satisfied." The authors argue that ethical
traditions, in the Aristotelean sense, supply a compelling foundation for corporate
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being of those upon whom they are dependent for their survival.2 9 Firms
need capital, but they are also dependent upon employees, consumers, the
natural environment, and communities. While charitable contributions
may not result in any direct, measurable benefits to the firm, such gifts
serve firms' long term or enlightened self interest. Giving, as serving the
firm's enlightened self interest, was very popular among corporate
executives in the late 1970s and 1980s. 0
There are three variants on the enlightened self interest theme. The
first focuses on infrastructure. 3 Recognizing that a "healthy corporation
cannot exist in a sick community," 32 corporations focus on both the things
and people that will ensure its success. By giving to education, a company
stresses the importance of training the work force for the future. By
supporting environmental efforts, the firm helps to ensure that there will
be natural resources in the future. The second variant is that doing good
results in reputational gains. A company that engages in philanthropic
activities, and does not do any harm to either society or the environment,
will be well thought of by stakeholders, and this will benefit it in the long
run. "The goal is to become known as a good corporate citizen.., then,
somewhere, somehow, your good image pays off."" Being regarded as
a good corporate citizen can lead to sales or favorable legislation, but it
can also give a firm the "benefit of the doubt" in difficult situations.34 It
giving.).
29. See Stendardi, supra note 19, at 22.
30. See ARTHUR H. WHITE & JOHN BARTOLOMEO, CORPORATE GIVING: THE VIEWS
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF MAJOR AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (Council on
Foundations 1982); DANIEL YANKELOVICH GROUP, INC., CORPORATE GIVING: THE
VIEWS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF MAJOR AMERICAN CORPORATIONS

(Council

on Foundations 1988); Arlow & Gannon, supra note 2, at 239; James S. Bowman,

Business and the Environment: Corporate Attitudes, Actions in Energy-Rich States, 25
MSU BUS. TOPICS 37, 38-40 (1977) (summarizing the empirical results of seven different
studies conducted in the mid to late 1970s to conclude that, during this period, businesses
were recognizing the importance of corporate giving and were acting upon these

concerns); Lyman E. Ostlund, Attitudes of Managers Toward Corporate Social
Responsibility, 19 CAL. MGMT. REV. 35, 38 (1977) (finding in their 1974 survey of
Fortune 500 executives that the arguments against corporate responsibility were
considered less important than the arguments for such involvement).

31. See Stendardi, supra note 19, at 25-27.
32. See id.
33. See Mark Henricks, Doing Well While Doing Good, 11 SMALL Bus. REP. 28

(1991).
34. See Charles Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What's in a Nane? Reputation Building
and CorporateStrategy, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J.233, 255 (1990).
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is difficult to "bank" one's image and to know when one's image "pays
off," but it is potentially a valuable corporate asset. 35
The third variant on this theme is outlined by Haley.36 He argues that
contributions to charity are more than assuring audiences that companies
are, after all, soulful. 37 As "corporate masques,"
corporate
•
31 contributions
can be much more proactive, strategic, and instrumental. Managers can
use contributions to acquire audiences by capturing the attention of key
stakeholders, to mime messages by symbolically transmitting corporate
interests to other stakeholders, and to vend values by institutionalizing
them in society.39 In other words, contributions can be vehicles to
communicate illusions and negotiate favorable corporate images in the eyes
of those upon whom they are dependent. In the course of this exchange,
contributions also communicate the company's message, mission,
intentions, and values. This not only can help assure audiences, but it can
also alert them to corporate power.'
In the most extreme case,
contributions can help to extend corporate influence, ideologies, and values
outside the business realm. In this respect contributions are strategic
resources which managers can use to mold society in a way which benefits
companies.
III. VARIETIES OF CORPORATE-NONPROFIT PARTNERSHIPS
We first describe the varieties of partnerships between firms and the
charity sector. We avoid the term corporate philanthropy, because this is
only one variety of corporate-nonprofit partnership. Looking only at
charitable contributions deducted under § 170 of the IRS tax code is too
restricting and does not give us a complete picture of the linkages and
35. See id. at 234 (explaining that firms compete for reputational status, which itself
depends upon internal variables such as informational "signals" and external variables
such as public selectivity).
36. See Usha C. V. Haley, Corporate Contributions As Managerial Mosques
Refraining Corporate Contributions As Strategies to Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT.
STUD. 485 (1991).

37. See id. at 486.

38. See id. at 486-87 (comparing how aristocrats in seventeenth-century English
courts used dramatic entertainment to impart lessons of moral values, called masques, to

how managers use contributions to influence stakeholders metaphorically).
39. See id. at 487.
40. See id.
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dependencies between the corporation and the charity sector today. 4' In
our framework the unit of analysis is the transaction between the business
corporation and the charity. Some of these have a clear quid pro quo and
benefits to the firm are clear. For example, a contract with a major
university for the rights to bring a new technology to market. However,
others are, for all practical purposes, unilateral transfer payments and it is
difficult to measure how they benefit the firm. For example, a grant to a
senior citizen's home or battered woman's shelter. These two distinctions,
the degree to which benefits accrue exclusively to the firm and are
measurable, will help structure our discussion of corporate/nonprofit
partnerships.
The distinction between benefits that are exclusive or inclusive
borrows directly from the distinction between private and public goods.
Consumption and ownership are non-problematic for the former, while
they are for the latter. The private good or service is divisible, and there
is no problem in delimiting ownership rights. This is problematic for
public or inclusive goods, because consumption or ownership by one actor
does not preclude the consumption or ownership by another. Goods or
outputs that provide exclusive benefits are not necessarily more valuable
than goods or services that are more inclusive. Although, it is easier to
price them and allocate costs, and they are the cornerstone of competitive
advantage. Rather, actors in economic, political, or social arenas, need
and value both.
Meterability refers to the ability to measure the benefits which result
from some transaction. Such measures can be quantitative or qualitative;
but there has to be some credible standard against which to evaluate the
benefits that one has come to realize.
High meterability implies
confidence in the ability to distinguish or cognitively differentiate among
outcomes. Low meterability implies that evaluators have difficulty
ranking, ordering, and judging the benefits of one outcome as opposed to
another. Meterability is important for any rationalizing process. Being
able to evaluate benefits is tantamount to holding the transaction
accountable. Some transactions produce benefits that are "greater" than
others and thus they have more value. Meterability thus is critical in
making and evaluating strategic decisions and decision-makers.
We can cross-classify the exclusivity/inclusivity and high/low
meterability of benefits that accrue to a firm to develop a typology of
41. We focus only on ties to public charities, i.e., not-for-profit organizations
exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations, memberships, or

partnerships with social welfare organizations, i.e., § 501(c)(4), will be left for others to
explore; see, e.g., BARRY D. KARL, THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS HANDBOOK 20-33
(James P. Shannon ed., 1991).
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firm/nonprofit partnerships. 42 In cell A, labeled Commercial Partnerships,
are transactions that produce benefits for the firm which are both
meterable (or measurable) and exclusive. Examples include cause-related
marketing and research and development contracts between industry and
universities.43 In cell B, labeled Strategic Partnerships, are transactions
which produce benefits which are exclusive to the firm, but which are
more difficult to measure. Examples include sponsorships, policy
marketing, and donations of equipment to educational institutions. Cell C,
labeled Civic Partnerships, includes transactions which result in clearly
measurable outcomes, but the benefits are shared by a wide range of other
actors. The firm has no expectation that it alone will benefit from this
activity. Examples include contributions to civic projects, art exhibitions,
capital projects, and disaster relief.'
Finally, in cell D, labeled
Philanthropic Partnerships, are transactions which produce outputs which
are neither meterable nor benefit exclusively the corporate partner.
Examples include unrestricted gifts and grants to general operating budgets
of charitable organizations, or contributions to the United Way. Benefits
typically accrue to third parties who are unrelated to corporate personnel,
such as patients in a children's hospital or students in an inner city school,
and are very difficult to evaluate either in the short or long term.
A. Commercial Partnerships
Commercial Partnerships are in cell A. Here firms enter into
contracts to purchase some good, service, or technology from nonprofit
organizations or, in the case of cause-related marketing, to use the
nonprofit's "good name" to sell their merchandise. These transactions
directly benefit, or add value to, the business partner, and the results are
relatively easy to measure. Expenses related to these transactions are
seldom tax deductible as charitable contributions. 46
Two types of commercial partnerships have received considerable
attention: cause-related marketing and research collaborations between hitech firms and universities and nonprofit research institutes. In causerelated marketing, a company chooses a cause, charity, or nonprofit
42. See Figure
43. See Figure
44. See Figure
45. See Figure

1, infra p. 1088.
1, infra p. 1088.
1, infra p. 1089.
1, infra p. 1090.

46. See Thomas A. Hemphill, Cause-Related Marketing, Fundraising, and
EnvironmentalNonprofit Organizations, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 403, 415

(1996).

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41

organization to adjoin itself and advertises this newly formed joint
venture.47 The arrangement is a "win-win" situation, because typically the
firm promises to give a percentage of the income from the sale of some
good or service to the nonprofit, and the company gets publicity through
its association with a credible nonprofit. 8 Since the product does not cost
any more to the customer, the added benefit that some charity is
"profiting" induces the customer to patronize the vendor. In this respect
it is a "coupon. "4 Cause-related marketing involves a clear quidpro quo;
the company expects a return. For this reason it is usually supported from
advertising or sales promotion budgets, not the foundation or community
relations.
There are several case studies and a few surveys that have
demonstrated that it works quite well. The most obvious case was
American Express Corporation's partnership with the Statue of Liberty.
Card usage increased 28% over the previous year, the number of new
cards issued rose 45 %, and the Statue of Liberty restoration fund received
$1.7 million from American Express." Other research has shown that
cause related marketing increases public awareness of the cause, expands
the nonprofit's base of support, and generates a more positive image of the
nonprofit among the public. 2
There is, however, a downside. Since cause related marketing creates
a virtual tie between the firm and the nonprofit, it makes them both liable
for one another's actions. 3 Cause related marketing can threaten to
commercialize nonprofits5 4 in what has been referred to as part of the
process of the "logoization of America," or it may redirect giving efforts
to only visible and appealing causes rather than those that might
47. See P. Rajan Varadarajan & Anil Menon, Cause-Related Marketing: A
Coalignment of Marketing Strategy and CorporatePhilanthropy, 52 J. MARKETING 58,
59-60 (1988).

48. See John R. Garrison, A New Twist To Cause Marketing, FUND RAISING
MGMT., Feb. 1990 at 40.
49. See id.
50. See Varadarajan & Menon, supranote 47, at 59.

51. See Wendy L. Wall, Helping Hands: Companies Change the Ways They Make
CharitableDonations, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1984, at Al.

52. See Hemphill, supra note 46, at 410 (citing examples of how environmental
groups have generated significant percentages of their annual budgets from cause-related
marketing agreements).
53. See Varadarajan & Menon, supra note 47, at 63 (explaining how some causerelated marketing programs blossom into joint ventures undertaken by the contributor and
the charity).
54. See Garrison, supra note 48, at 40.
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necessarily need-the most.55 If a charity does not have mass appeal, it will
be overlooked by corporations seeking to make a profitable partnership.
Scientific collaboration is another form of commercial partnership.
Examples include research parks (or science parks or technology parks)
and technology incubators.56The generic model is that companies become
tenants of the park with the expectation that close proximity to the
university, its people, its resources, and other hi-tech firms, will facilitate
technology transfer.57 Research or technology parks can be nonprofit or
for-profit, owned by a university or a university-related entity, or owned
by a non-university entity with contractual relationships to a university. 5
In technology incubators the emphasis is on small, entrepreneurial
businesses who share support services, such as, financing, marketing, and
management. 59 The success of these parks and incubators ultimately
depends upon the faculty adopting them as their own and working with
tenants on research of common interest, and the ability of businesses to
turn scientific knowledge into marketable products.
The joint venture or limited partnership is another form of scientific
collaboration. Universities are now able to capture exclusive commercial
right to their discoveries, and then to both patent and license those
discoveries to U.S. companies for further development. 60 The company
may purchase the rights to the license or it may simply make a
"contribution" to gain access to the new knowledge. 6I In exchange the
55. See Nora Ganim Barnes, Joint Venture Marketing: A Strategy for the 1990s, 9
Q. 23, 25 (1991); Patricia Caesar, Cause-RelatedMarketing:The New

HEALTH MARKETING

Face of Corporate Philanthropy, 59 BUS. SOC'Y REV. 15, 17-18 (1986); Timothy S.

Mescon & Donn J. Tilson, Corporate Philanthropy:A StrategicApproach to the BottomLine, 29 CAL. MGMT. REV. 49 (1987).
56. See Eva Klein, Technology Parks and Incubators:A Nexus Between University
Science andIndustriaIResearchandDevelopment,in INNOVATIVE MODELS FOR UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH 11-48 (C. R. Haden & J.R. Brink eds., 1992).
57. See id.
58. See ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY RELATED RESEARCH PARKS, MEMBERSHIP
DIRECTORY, (AURRP 1991).

59. See Klein, supra note 56.
60. See Bruce D. Merrifield, Research Consortia The ConcurrentManagement of
Innovation, in INNOVATIVE MODELS FOR UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 49-62 (C.R. Haden& J.R.
Brink eds., 1992) (citing the $100 million relationship between Washington University
and Monsanto, which resulted in 16 patents on proteins and peptides).
61. See Eric G. Campbell, Philanthropy and Self-Interest: Academic-Industry
Research Relationships (1996) (unpublished PhD. thesis, University of Minnesota) (on
file with the author) The author demonstrated that firms which had license agreements
with universities were more likely to make charitable contributions to universities as well.
The interpretation was that charitable contributions are the "grease" which help to smooth
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university (and/or faculty) obtains royalties and at times an equity position

in the firm. 62 Although this sounds relatively straightforward, it is not.

Many contingencies may arise, such as, product liability, sub-licensing,
and further product development by the licensee, that can undermine the
collaboration.63
Just as in the case of cause-related marketing, there is very little
altruism in the scientific collaboration. The firm fully expects to realize
some tangible benefit and will negotiate as hard with the university as with
any other business partner for its position. Fees to acquire licenses or
dividends paid to equity partners are rarely treated as charitable
contributions. On the university's side, these collaborations are, for the
most part, simply another revenue stream for administrators to tap.
Clearly, the purpose is to transfer technology exclusively to a proprietary
firm who can then exploit the privileged information for personal gain and
to benefit the university.
B. Strategic Partnerships
Firms will use strategic partnerships to realize direct, exclusive
benefits for the firm, however, it is often difficult to measure these
"benefits." In this respect strategic partnerships are akin to advertising
expenditures, public or government relations initiatives, and PAC
over the rough edges of licensing contracts; also the contributions are a way in which
firms ensure that they have an inside track on what is happening at the university. In a
later analysis he showed that a significant percentage of faculty who received gifts from
industry thought that the company (or companies) expected either pre-publication review
of articles or reports (32%), ownership of all patentable results from the gift (19%), a
future consulting relationship (29%), evaluation/testing of company products (30%), or
training of company employees (9%) in return for the gift. See id.
62. See Merrifield, supra note 60 (illustrating how the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Stanford both receive one third of the profits realized from patents
licensed to manufacturing, marketing and distribution companies).
63. Some of the more spectacular examples of industry-university collaboration have
been in the area of biotechnology. For a description and analysis of partnerships in this
industry see Stephen R. Barley et al., StrategicAlliances in Commercial Biotechnology,
in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM, AND ACTION 311-347 (Nitin
Nohria & Robert G. Eccles eds., 1992); Walter W. Powell & Peter Brantley, Competitive
Cooperation in Biotechnology: Learning Through Networks?, in NETWORKS AND
ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FoRM, AND ACTION 366-394 (Nitin Nohria & Robert G.
Eccles eds., 1992); Anthony Montgomery, Technology Transfer from Universities:
Elements of Success, in INNOVATIVE MODELS FOR UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 68-69 (C.R.
Haden & J.R. Brink eds., 1992).
64. See NORMAN E. BOWIE, UNIVERSITY-BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS, AN ASSESSMENT
(Steven M. Cahn ed. 1994).
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contributions. Strategic partnerships are often initiated by marketing
departments, and expenditures are seldom deducted as charitable
contributions.65 However, there are some instances when they are. We
focus on three types of strategic partnerships: sponsorships, policy
marketing, and donations of products.
Sponsorships are a familiar method of funding not-for-profit
organizations. Typically the company pays an amount of money to the
not-for-profit in exchange for the right to display its name or logo at some
event, on the premises, or in conjunction with some program of the notfor-profit.
Sponsorships can range from buying "tents" at golf
tournaments, to paying for a theater season, to funding mega-events such
as Live Aid, Farm Aid, and Hands Across America.66
In her study of media sponsorship of nonprofit events in the Twin
Cities, Bryan found that seldom did company spokespersons claim that
they derived any direct or measurable benefits from their sponsorships. 67
Over and over they said "hopefully" sponsorships increased listenership.6 s
The goal was to gain credibility by borrowing legitimacy from the event
or cause. Thus, companies would not sponsor just any event or nonprofit.
There had to be a good fit with the firm, the cause could not be too
controversial, and there had to be a way to display the sponsorship to
audiences. 69 The focus is usually on the event-which is supposed to be
fun-rather than on the problem which, in most cases, is serious."0 In the
case of media sponsorships, the event also should be "newsworthy." That
way it can be shown on the evening news as a news story and used to
showcase the station's sponsorship.
Post and Waddock researched sponsorship of so-called mega-events. 7,
In their case study of Hands Across America, which took place May 25,
1986, they described the organizational challenge of getting 6 million
people across the United States to do something together at the same
time.72 Coca Cola was the original corporate sponsor, and USA for
65. See Hemphill, supra note 46, at 415.
66. See Caesar, supra note 55, at 16-17 (citing examples).
67. See Kate Bryan, Corporate and Media Sponsorship of Nonprofit Events in a
Marketing Oriented Society (1991) (unpublished Master's Project, University of
Minnesota, School of Journalism and Mass Communication) (on file with author).
68. See id.

69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See James E. Post & Sandra A. Waddock, Social Cause Partnershipand the
"Mega-Event":Hunger, Homelessness and Hands Across America, in 11 RESEARCH IN
CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY

72. See id.

181 (James E. Post ed. 1989).
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Africa, a collection of Hollywood types and recording artists, was the
parent organization." Coca Cola not only provided money, but also its
mass marketing expertise, access to 84% of the consumer market, and
local partnerships through the Coca-Cola bottler network.74 Coke was
joined by Citibank as a key corporate sponsor, and together they promoted
the event on national television, radio, and through point-of-purchase
promotions.' Other companies subsequently: purchased "miles" along
the way, American Express; bought billboard advertising, 3M; printed
advertising on grocery bags, Safeway stores; and printed advertising on
trayliners, McDonalds. 7
This case showed that sponsorships are not without their problems.
Although Hands Across America raised more than $25 million and netted
$16 million, there was considerable criticism in the media in the weeks
following.77 Most centered on how slow the money had been distributed,
how regions and locales were getting less back than they donated, and how
none of this really reduced hunger or homelessness.7 This may have been
due partly to the huge business marketing presence which gave the event
more of a commercial flavor than a social cause and raised suspicions
among many.79 Post and Waddock stated, "Advocates of social causes
may be willing to make Faustian bargains with commercial sponsors in
order to serve their causes because they are worthy, but the public may be
much less tolerant."" Once an event gets caught up in public discourse
and media hype, both organizers and sponsors lose control over how
people interpret their actions.
A second type of strategic partnership is what Smith calls policy
marketing.A1 Here, lobbying funds are mixed with donations to generate
grassroots support for various social and political causes. He cites Binney
& Smith, the maker of Crayola crayons, advocating for state funding of
arts in education, bike manufacturers donating to nonprofits pushing for
more bike trails, and insurers who contribute to public interest coalitions
pushing for the "liberalization" of industry controls.82 We would also
include contributions to many "educational" nonprofits that have blatant
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

190.

187.
194.
195-96.

80. See id. at 196.
81. See Smith, supra note 22, at 111.
82. See id.
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political agendas. Many 501(c)(3) organizations which have "education"
as their purpose, often engage in activities that are more like
propagandizing, advocating, lobbying, and even campaigning. 3 We have
even seen a rise in "politicized philanthropies" recently, for example,
Newt Gingrich's Progress and Freedom Foundation.' However, many
important public policy institutes have status under § 501(c)(3) as well.
Corporate support for The American Enterprise Institute, The Brookings
Institute, The Heritage Foundation, The Urban Institute, and The
Progressive Policy Institute, is long-standing. 8
The third type of strategic partnership is the donation of equipment to
nonprofits.
Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
manufacturers can deduct, as charitable contributions, the cost of the
equipment donated plus half of the difference between the cost and selling
price of the equipment, if they give the equipment to educational6
institutions and the latter uses it as scientific equipment or apparatus.1
This opened the door for computer companies like IBM, AT&T, Apple,
and Hewlett Packard, to donate considerable inventory to colleges and
universities.' While companies may have rationalized these gifts as part
of their philanthropic commitment to higher education, in reality there
were many direct benefits which they hoped to realize, e.g., access to
leading edge researchers and prospective employees, opportunities to
experiment with new operating systems and software, opportunities to
cultivate relations with prospectiye institutional customers, and occasions
83. See, e.g., Kahn, supranote 6, at 654 (Professor Kahn notes that some nonprofits
have created what she calls the "c3/c4 split." Legally two organizations exist, one
exempt under 501(c)(3) and one exempt under 501(c)(4), however, there is only one
entity with the same offices, staff, and infrastructure. The only difference is that
contributions to the former are tax deductible as charitable contributions, while donations
to the latter are not).
84. See Kahn, supra note 6, at 645 (stating that Newt Gingrich's Progress and
Freedom Foundation is an extreme example).

85. See id. at 651-52.
86. A similar deduction is available for those wishing to make contributions to
nonprofits that benefit infants, the needy, and the ill, which, of course, greatly affects
pharmaceutical company donations. See, e.g., Michael Useem & Stephen I. Kunter,

Corporate Contributions to Culture and the Arts: The Organization of Giving and the
Influence of the Chief Executive Officer and of Other Firms on Company Contributions
in Massachusetts, in NONPROFIT
CONSTRAINT

ENTERPRISE IN THE ARTS: STUDIES IN MISSION AND

93 (Paul DiMaggio ed. 1986).

87. See Ed Joyce, CorporateDollarson Campus:Who Profits?, DATAMATION, Apr.

15, 1987, at 64.
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to introduce future individual customers to their products. 88 However,
these types of donations could seldom be justified in terms of return on
investment.8 9
C. Civic Partnerships
Civic partnerships are distinct from the previous two varieties, because
while the benefits are easy to meter, the beneficiary is not the individual
donor but rather the larger community. Civic partnerships also have a
long history. Projects can be initiated either by some actor in the
nonprofit or government sectors, and firms can be solicited for
contributions that will be pooled with others to complete the project. For
example, firms in Minneapolis-St. Paul contributed $4 million in charitable
dollars and $10.7 million in private investments to acquire land upon
which the Hubert H. Metrodome was constructed. 90 It is reported that the
business community in Milwaukee will contribute $14 million for the
construction of the new Brewers baseball stadium, Miller Park (although
we do not know how much of this is in the form of charitable
contributions). 9' In Minneapolis-St. Paul alone, local and out-of-town
businesses have also made charitable contributions to help defray costs for
hosting the U.S. Olympic Festival ($8 million in contributions and
sponsorships in 1990), 9 the International Special Olympics ($22 million
in contributions, sponsorships, equipment, and services in 1991)," 3 the
Super Bowl ($2 million in charitable cash contributions and $2 million in
88. See id. (citing AT&T's $4.5 million gift of computer equipment to the University
of Virginia which qualified as a tax deduction under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, and which fostered a reliance by students on AT&T operating systems).
89. See id. at 68 (explaining that such intangible benefits as educating bright students
and contributing to the design process of new technology cannot be measured on a
balance sheet).
90. See AMY KLOBUCHAR, UNCOVERING THE DOME 101 (1982).
91. Note that these contributions are distinct from companies leasing the right to lend
their name to a publicly owned stadium for a fixed number of years. Examples of this
include Coors Brewing Company and Coors Field in Denver and Miller Brewing
Company and Miller Park in Milwaukee. Because these lease arrangements yield a direct
benefit to the firm in terms of advertising, we would consider them examples not civic
partnerships. See Charles Whiting, Other Cities' Stadium Lessons, MINNEAPOLIS STARTRIB., Aug. 25, 1996, at A21.

92. See Richard Mayhew, Many in the Business Helping Out: Special Olympics
Inspires Much CorporateGenerosity, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., July 23, 1991, at 13A.

93. See id.
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in-kind services in 1992), 94 and building a new structure to house the
Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota ($20
million in total raised among firms and individuals in 1995). 95
These transactions are more "charitable" than the previous two
because of the benefits which accrue to the larger community. Keim has
commented on the "public goods" nature of many charitable gifts which
creates disincentives for any one donor to contribute. 96 Galaskiewicz notes
that in a situation where the other players are one's competitors, the
disincentives are even greater, because the chiseler now has unspent
resources that it can use to gain an advantage over donors.97 Yet
contributing to these projects is attractive, because the benefits are so
visible. Although the firm itself cannot hope to gain any strategic
advantage, executives can at least point to results and take pride in their
efforts to get something accomplished.
D. PhilanthropicPartnerships
Philanthropic Partnerships are, of course, what most people regard as
corporate philanthropy: unrestricted gifts to the operating budgets of
theaters, schools, orphanages, and social service agencies to name just a
few charities that benefit. These gifts often receive no fanfare, are
sometimes listed in annual reports or programs of donees, and firms
seldom take credit for them. 98 What makes these gifts distinctive is that
94. See Annette Berger et al., Presentation of Public-PrivatePartnershipsin the
Urban Community: An Example of an InterorganizationalAction System, Paper
Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association (August 2024, 1992).

95. See Dan Wascoe, Jr., The Art of Charity: U's Biomedical Institute Exhibits
Fund-RaisingSkill at Museum Show, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Nov. 22, 1995, at 1D.
96. See Gerald D. Keim, Corporate Social Responsibility: As Assessment of the
Enlightened Self-Interest Model, 3 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 32, 35 (1978) (stating that firms
have an incentive to "ride free" because once a public gift is created; everyone benefits,
whether or not they contributed).
97. See JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AN URBAN GRANTS
ECONOMY: A STUDY OF BUSINESS PHILANTHROPY AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1981 (1985) (The author describes how corporations who give voluntary gifts and are in
competition with those who do not give gifts, "find themselves at a disadvantage."
Everyone benefits, but the chiseler now has unspent resources that it can use to gain a
market advantage over its competitors who make a contribution).
98. However, this is not always true. Professor Kahn gives several examples of how
firms will go out of their way to advertise all the "good" things they are doing for
nonprofits. She also cites work showing that consumers tend to be responsive to this sort
of advertising. See Kahn, supra note 6, at 670-71.
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they benefit third parties and it is virtually impossible to know what
difference one's singular contribution makes.
E. DiscussionClearly there are many varieties of corporate-nonprofit linkage. Some
directly benefit the firm and are relatively easy to measure; others only
benefit actors outside the firm and often it is very difficult to measure the
outcomes. It is probably safe to say that Milton Friedman and his
followers would be comfortable with the former but not the latter and that
stakeholder theory would be comfortable with both but would emphasize
the value of the latter. 99
Is embracing one or the other position simply a matter of company
philosophy or are there systematic differences across firms and/or
industries which can explain why some embrace the stakeholder position
while others are more pragmatic? These are the questions which we now
attempt to answer.

IV. COVARIATES OF CORPORATE-NONPROFIT PARTNERSHIPS
The empirical work on corporate giving shows that all firms do not
give the same amounts to charity. In this section we describe the
covariates of corporate contributions focusing on profits, market position,
ownership, and social context. We caution that while studies of charitable
contributions are plentiful, research on cause related marketing, industryuniversity relations, and sponsorships are quite limited. Therefore the
bulk of our discussion is limited to transactions that are concentrated in
cells C and D of Figure 1.100
A. Profits
An important correlate of corporate contributions is profits. Whether
researchers use pretax net income,' 0 ' the log of pretax net income, °2 or
99. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).

100. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
101. See Peter Navarro, The Income Elasticity of CorporateContributions, 28 Q.
REv. ECON. Bus. 66, 66-75 (1988); McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 2; Joseph
Galaskiewicz & Stanley Wasserman, Mimetic Processes Within an Interorganizational
Field:An EmpiricalTest, 34 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 454 (1989).

102. See CHARLES T.

CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE

GIVING 171 (1985); see also McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 2, at 395; Galaskiewicz,
supra note 97, at 59.
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ratios of pretax and after-tax net income to revenues, assets, and equity;
the results are basically the same.
In addition to the obvious capacity story, there are two additional
reasons why contributions are so tightly coupled to profits. First, there is
the "rule of thumb" argument. Companies often have a policy of giving
a certain percentage of pretax net income to charity.'°4 Dayton-Hudson,
for example, contributes 5 % of its pretax earnings to charity.' 5 Also,
tithing clubs have stipulated 2 % or 5 % of pretax profits as a standard for
their members. 6 These set percentages are normative, and there typically
is no economic or business rationale for these levels. Yet these norms
appear to be quite powerful.
Another reason that profits are an important correlate of contributions
is the tax law. Because charitable contributions are deductible against
pretax earnings, they are viewed as a way to reduce the company's taxes.
Currently, firms can deduct charitable gifts up to 10% of pretax net
income (5% up to 1981), and this sets a ceiling on giving. However,
firms seldom come close to giving this much.0 7 Most research has
focused on the complement of the marginal tax rate or the "price" of a
contribution. Several researchers have found that company contributions
are sensitive to changes in the marginal tax rate, although the price effect
for corporate giving appears to be considerably smaller than that for
individual contributions.' 0 8 Schwartz, looking at data extending from 1936
through 1961, analyzed industrial groups together, and then nine separate
industry categories.' 0 9 Controlling for the average after-tax income and
then for cash flows, the complement of the average tax rate consistently
had a negative effect on contributions. "° Nelson looked at industry-level

103. See Peter Navarro, supra note 101, at 67; Joseph Galaskiewicz, An Urban
Grants Economy Revisited: Corporate Community Service In the Twin Cities, 1979-81,
1987-89 (1996) (working paper on file with author).
104. See id. McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 2, at 403 (analyzing the elasticity of

corporate contributions with respect to profits).
105. See id.
106. See Navarro, supra note 7, at 82.
107. See GIVING USA 1996: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE

YEAR 1995, at 90 (1996) [hereinafter GIVING USA] (showing that this ceiling has a
minimal impact on giving, given that contributions as a percent of pretax net income has
hovered around 1% for decades; this ceiling seems to affect only firms which have had
poor earnings but are saddled with commitments to nonprofits which they want to honor).
108. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 102, at 170-71; Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable
Giving and Tac Legislation in the Reagan Era, 48 LAWv & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1985).
109. See R. A. Schwartz, Corporate PhilanthropicContributions, 23 J. FIN. 479,
484, 486-87 (1968).
110. See id. at 495.
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data between 1936 and 1963, and analyzed aggregate after-tax corporation
income, the complement of the marginal tax rate, and aggregate
contributions of corporations."' He, too, found a price effect, but his
analysis produced a lower price elasticity coefficient. " Similar findings
on the relationship between marginal tax rate and giving were found by
Levy, Shatto, and Clotfelter. 13 In her analysis Webb found that when the
tax rate was high or was likely to fall in the near future, firms were more
likely to increase giving to their corporate foundation. " 4 This ensured that
total disbursements (direct giving + foundation grants) remained
5 "smooth"
over time and the firm was still able to minimize its taxes.'
While rules of thumb and tax rates are important factors in explaining
the correlation between contributions and profits, there are still many
unanswered questions. For instance, why does a firm embrace a 2 % rule
instead of a 5% rule? While changes in tax rates can explain aggregate
changes in giving, tax rates do not explain variations across firms within
years."' Also, in surveys, executives do not consistently emphasize the
importance of tax factors in accounting for their contributions."'
Finally, pretax net income might be tightly coupled to tax deductible
contributions, but it may be more loosely coupled to total disbursements.
Firms can make charitable gifts to the nonprofit community directly and
through their foundations. Since corporate foundations are themselves
501(c)(3) organizations, contributions to the foundation are tax
deductible." 8 There are several reasons for a foundation, but the most
frequently cited are that firms can "smooth out" their disbursements and
take advantage of changes in the marginal tax rates. 9 Firms will increase
111. See RALPH L. NELSON,
CORPORATION GIVING 7 (1970).

ECONOMIC FACTORS

IN THE GROWTH OF

112. See id.
113. See Ferdinand K. Levy & Gloria M. Shatto, The Evaluation of Corporate
Contributions, 33 PUB. CHOICE 19-28 (1978); CLOTFELTER, supra note 102.
114. See Natalie I. Webb, Tax and Government Policy Implications for Corporate
Foundation Giving, 23 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q.

41-67 (1994) (explaining

that corporations adjust their contributions to "take advantage of changes in tax rates").
115. See id.
116. See Ronald S. Burt, Corporate Philanthropy as a Cooptive Relation, 62 Soc.
FORCES 419, 426 (1983); McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 2, at 396; Navarro, supra
note 101; GALASKIEWICZ, supra note 97, at 59.
117. See WHITE & BARTOLOMEO, supra note 30, at 54-55; McElroy & Siegfried,
supranote 2, at 409; see also Harris & Klepper, supra note 27, at 41 (discussing differing
results regarding executives' beliefs in the importance of tax incentives in motivating
contributions).
118. See HARRIS & KLEPPER, supra note 27, at 41.
119. See Webb, supra note 114, at 48.
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giving to their foundation in higher-profit years or in anticipation of an
increase in the price of giving, then in years when corporate profits are
lower or giving to charity is more costly the foundation draws on its
reserves and supports nonprofits with its funds." The problem is that
many studies use total disbursements and not tax deductible contributions
as their dependent variable. In years when the amounts going into the
foundation are comparable to the amounts being disbursed, there is no
issue. However, when companies are either in a high-profit or low-profit
situation, the two numbers can be radically different. Thus, it is not
unusual to find firms with negative earnings with substantial disbursements
or super-performers giving at very low levels.
B. Market Position
Another important set of correlates include: percent of sales to
consumers, labor intensities, and institutional vulnerability. Burt found
that the amount of industry-wide contributions measured in absolute
dollars, per capita dollars, or as a proportion of profits was directly
associated with the percentage of sales to households.'' There was also
an association between expenditures on advertising, contributions, and
market position. Fry, Keim, and Meiners found that: (1) marginal
changes in advertising expenditures and marginal changes in contribution
expenditures were significantly related; (2) firms with more public contact
spent more at all income levels on advertising and contributions than did
firms with little public contact; and (3) changes in contributions and
changes in other business expenses usually considered to be profit
motivated-such as officer compensation, dividends, and employee
Levy and Shatto found that
benefits-were highly correlated. 2 2
expenditures for advertising were highly correlated with the level of giving
when controlling for both net income and net investment." Levy and
Shatto looked at investor-owned electric utilities and found a correlation
between philanthropic giving as a percentage of gross income and
expenditures on advertising and customer services.'2 4 Navarro also found
120. See id. at 54-60.
121. See also Galaskiewicz, supra note 103 (using firm level data, found no effect
between percent sales to consumers and giving).
122. See Fry et al., supra note 2, at 105.
123. See Levy & Shatto, supra note 113, at 22.
124. See id.
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correlations between marginal changes in contributions and advertising
budgets. "
Nelson found that an industry with 10% more employees gave 2.7%
more in contributions, when controlling for sales, profits, and officers'
compensation.126 More recently, Fry, Keim, Meiners, and Navarro found
positive correlations between marginal changes in contributions and labor
intensities. 27 The Council on Foundations reported that 60 % of the CEOs
they surveyed said that contributions to charity help to attract good people
to the community and company.12 Approximately 80% of the larger firms
cited this as one of their rationales for giving. 29
Ermann argued that firms which are particularly vulnerable to public
opinion are likely to be bigger contributors. 3 Examining contributions
to the Public Broadcasting System, he found that many oil companies and
firms that had recently increased their profits were among the biggest
contributors. ' Miles showed how the tobacco industry, when challenged
by the Sloan-Kettering Commission and the Surgeon General's Report on
smoking's health hazards, immediately responded by funneling millions of
dollars to universities and research institutes that did work on cancerrelated topics.13 2 This put the tobacco companies in touch with research
that was of immediate interest to them, but the contributions also gave a
signal to the public that the industry wanted to support "objective"
research on the effects of cigarette smoking.
Most researchers regard these effects as evidence that firms give so as
to enhance their reputations among critical stakeholders and effectively
coopt them. For example, the correlations between contributions, percent
125. See Navarro, supra note 7, at 78 (describing how the same attributes of a firms
product, such as heterogeneity and durability, that cause a firm to advertise also cause a
firm to contribute more).
126. See id.
127. See Fry et al., supra note 2, at 98; Navarro, supra note 101; see also
GALASKIEWICZ, supra note 97 (finding no effect of labor intensities); Galaskiewicz &
Wasserman, supra note 101 (finding a negative effect).
128. See DANIEL YANKELOVICH GROUP, INC., supra note 30, at 41.
129. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 2; DANIEL YANKELOVICH GROUP, INC.,
supra note 30.
130. See David M. Ermann, The Operative Goals of Corporate Philanthropy:
Contributionsto the Public Broadcasting Service, 1972-1976, 25 Soc. PROBS. 504, 510
(1978).
131. See id.
132. See ROBERT H. MILES, COFFIN NAILS AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 61 (1982)

(stating that "grants in excess of seven million" were given to over two hundred scientists
in over one hundred hospitals, universities, and research institutions which otherwise
would seek funding from the government or non-profit anti-smoking groups).
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sales to consumers, and labor intensities suggest that contributions are
interpreted as strategies to enhance corporate reputations as trustworthy
and responsible corporate citizens. These good will efforts hopefully
result in customers buying their products, improvements in employee
morale, and sympathy and respect among the general public.
Indeed, Galaskiewicz, Fombrun and Shanley found that companies
which gave more to charities were regarded by constituencies outside the
133
firm as being especially generous and more socially responsible.
Galaskiewicz also found that companies which gave more to charity were
34
regarded by business leaders as more successful business enterprises.
Fully 40% of the CEOs in the Council on Foundations study said that
corporate giving "enhances the company's image with customers,
stockholders and the like," and 52% said that giving is "good for public
relations."1 35 That community service pays off was illustrated when
Dayton-Hudson was threatened by a hostile takeover in 1987, and the state
of Minnesota came quickly to its defense. There was no doubt that
because Dayton-Hudson was so heavily involved in giving to36 the
community, the community felt an obligation to fight on its behalf. 1
C. Ownership
Research has been mixed on the relationship between ownership
patterns and company giving. Atkinson and Galaskiewicz found that as the
ownership of the firm became more concentrated, contributions to charity
declined.
More specifically, they found that in companies where the
133. See GALAsKIEWIcz, supra note 97, at 67 (finding that companies which gave
more to charity were viewed by more local elites as generous to nonprofits); Charles
Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What's in a Name? Reputation Building and Corporate
Strategy, 33 AcAD. MGMT. J.233, 251 (1990) (finding that the public assigned higher
reputations to firms that gave proportionately more to charity than other firms); see also
Haley, supranote 36, at 495; Arthur H. White, CorporatePhilanthropy:Impact on Public
Attitudes, in CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY IN THE EIGHTIES (1980).
134. See GALASKIEWiCZ, supranote 97, at 67.
135. See DANIEL YANKELOVICH GROUP, INC., supra note 30, at 45.

136. See Council on Foundation, Dayton Hudson Corporation: Conscience and
Control (A, B, C,). Washington D.C.: Council on Foundations (1990); see also Gregory
E. David, Of Grants and Grief.- Trying to do Good Can Sometimes Keep a Company
from Doing Well, FIN. WORLD, August 3 1993, at 64-65 (arguing that there are costs to

community outreach; one should be reminded of the turmoil caused by opponents of
Planned Parenthood who publicly chastised and threatened boycotts of corporate funders,
including Dayton-Hudson, who supported Planned Parenthood. For some firms,
capitulating to the protestors' demands created more problems than any boycott would as
pro-choice customers became outraged at such "corporate cowardice").
137. See Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, supra note 10, at 98.
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CEO owned a greater percentage of stock or where there was another
individual, other than the CEO, who owned more than 5% of the
company's stock, the company gave less to charity.'3 8 Also, in firms
where the CEO owned at least 20% of the stock and there was another
individual who owned at least 5% of the stock, or a single corporate
interest owned 5 % of the company's stock, contributions were significantly
less. 39 In their study of corporate boards and contributions, Wang and
Coffey found a strong positive relationship between the proportion of
insiders to outsiders and firms' charitable contributions. However, Wang
and Coffey also found that the percentage of stock owned by inside
directors was positively related to firms' charitable contributions, and there
was no linear relationship between ownership concentration and firms'
charitable giving. Furthermore Navarro found no relationship between
managerial control and contributions. n4
Firms disciplined by tight principal control should give less to charity,
while firms with more diffuse ownership-and thus greater managerial
autonomy-should give more. Giving away shareholder money to charity,
perhaps to benefit managerial utility, is just one more example of
managerial opportunism and shirking behavior in the absence of
monitoring.'
This proposition comes directly from agency theory.
Because of the weak coupling of charitable giving to company
performance, principals (i.e., owners) or agents who are accountable to
powerful owning interests (families, individuals, or corporate investors),
are less likely to make contributions. It is simply not in an owner's
business interest to give his/her/its money to charity. Only when
managers are free of ownership responsibility/supervision are they likely
to indulge themselves in such fanciful activities.r"
D. Social Context
Research has also found significant social context effects at both the
micro and macro levels. At the micro level Galaskiewicz found that
companies in Minneapolis-St. Paul gave more, if their Chief Executive
Officer, top executives, or board members moved in the social circles of
a cadre of local businesspersons promoting corporate giving and corporate
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Galaskiewicz, supra note 103.
See Galaskiewicz, supra note 103.
See Navarro, supra note 7; Wang & Coffey, supra note 10.
See Kahn, supra note 6; CLOTFELTER, supra note 102.
See Shaw & Post, supra note 28; Kahn, supra note 6, at 609-19 (discussing

these issues).
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social responsibility.' 43 Also, companies gave money to specific charities
if this cadre thought the nonprofits were providing essential services or
were outstanding or they used the organizations themselves.144 Executives
and elites reported that peer pressure was an important factor. 4 5 More
importantly, informal social structures were also a means by which CEOs
and their lieutenants were socialized into the Twin Cities business
subculture. "
These findings mirrored the research of Useem who showed that an
"inner circle" of business elites and peer pressure were important factors
in motivating corporate community service on a national scale.147 Useem
found that companies with more "inner circle" directors on their boards
were more likely to be recognized as generous contributors to the arts, as
members of arts or educational organizations, or as larger contributors in
general. 48 Ratcliff, Gallagher, and Ratcliff found that firms which were
better represented on local corporate
boards also tended to be better
49
represented on nonprofit boards.
At the macro level, Useem found that company giving to the arts was
influenced by broader local business support of the arts, and giving to the
arts increased even more if companies reported that their giving program
was highly responsive to outside business pressures. 50 Navarro found that
firms in cities with tithing clubs were giving at much higher rates than
firms in cities without these clubs. McElroy and Siegfried found that a
firm increased its contributions if other firms in their city had higher
143. See GALASKIEWiCZ, supra note 97, at 68 (finding that firms whose executives
had extensive network ties to philanthropic leaders gave more to charity controlling for
pretax net income, labor intensities, birthplace of the CEO, and the percent of employees
in the local area).
144. See Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, supra note 101.
145. See GALAsKIEWicz, supra note 97, at 72-75 (describing how peer pressure

arises in friendship circles and if you do not support your friends' projects they will not
support yours).

146. See

GALAsKIEWIcz, supranote 97, at 72-75.
147. See MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE 126-27 (1984).
148. See id. at 127.
149. See Richard E. Ratcliff et. al., The Civic Involvement of Bankers:An Analysis

of the Influence of Economic Power and Social Prominence in the Command of Civic
Policy Positions, 26 Soc. PROBS. 298, 302 (1979).
150. See Michael Useem & Stephen I. Kutner, Corporate Contributionsto Culture
and the Arts: The Organizationof Giving and the Influence of the Chief Executive Officer
and of Other Firms on Company Contributions in Massachusetts, in NONPROFIT
ENTERPRISE IN THE ARTS: STUDIES IN MISSION AND CONSTRAINT

ed., 1986).
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contributions.15' Again, the authors attributed this to "expectations," and
suggested that a great deal of corporate giving was motivated by the desire
to be responsive to respected peers in the business community. 5
Kirchberg and Wolpert studied social context using a different
strategy.' 53 Kirchberg studied eleven metropolitan areas between 1977
and 1991 and found that changes in corporate arts support were correlated
with change in social and economic conditions, i.e., increases in service
sector income, decreases in manufacturing sector income, and increases in
population's educational attainment. 5 4 In a secondary analysis of local
generosity that included corporate giving as a dependent variable, Wolpert
found that giving was greater where larger corporations were prominent,
income was greater, unemployment was lower, and the welfare ideology
was more liberal. 5 The authors also interpreted these findings in terms
of "local attitudes and regional climates of corporate giving. "'16
While peer pressure, other companies, and social context clearly
influence company giving, commentators' reactions to these effects differ
radically. On one hand, social effects are seen as examples of "managerial
utility" or how managers will choose to sacrifice profits in order to make
contributions, because of the prestige, good fellowship, and approval they
come to realize personally.15 7 On the other hand, these social effects are
viewed as humanizing, catholic influences which allow the community to
"speak" to the firm even though this "community" is made up primarily
of powerful business people who are members of the local establishment.
Regardless, these effects tend to be the most controversial and stir the ire
of critics on both the political left and right.
V. SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION

Our final task is to integrate the two literature reviews. In the first
section we identified four general varieties of corporate-nonprofit
partnerships: Commercial, Strategic, Civic, and Charitable Partnerships.
151. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 2, at 407; Navarro, supra note 7, at 82.
152. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 2, at 407.
153. See Volker Kirchberg, Arts Sponsorship and the State of the City, 19 J.
CULTURAL ECON. 305 (1995); JULIAN WOLPERT, PATTERNS OF GENEROSITY IN
AMERICA: WHO'S HOLDING THE SAFETY NET? (1993).
154. See Kirchberg, supranote 153, at 311 (stating a more fully developed economic
sector may have more profitable companies with the ability to provide bigger arts
contributions).
155. See WOLPERT, supra note 153, at 25.
156. See WOLPERT, supranote 153 (discussing how generosity depends on the state
or locality and the economic status of the residents).
157. See WILLIAMSON, supranote 8; Kahn, supra note 6, at 609-15.
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We distinguished between transactions that resulted in exclusive,
measurable benefits, and those that resulted in difficult-to-measure benefits
that serve community more than firm interests. Then we identified four
sets of variables that researchers have found to be covariates of company
contributions: profits, market position, ownership, and social context.
In Figure 2 we present four hypothetical graphs.1 8 Each graph has
two axes. The horizontal (or X-axis) is profits normalized for industry
and firm size. Since profits tend to be highly skewed we try to reflect this
in our scaling. The vertical axis (or Y-axis) is expenditures on nonprofits.
Each graph represents a different type of expenditure. Graphs A, B, C,
and D represent expenditures on Commercial, Strategic, Civic, and
Philanthropic Partnerships respectively among firms in a given industry of
a given size. Since these expenditures also tend to be highly skewed, we
take this into account in our scaling of the Y-axis. The solid line in each
graph is a hypothetical description of the relationship between net income
and expenditures for the various partnerships, and the dotted lines
represent the variance in levels of giving at each level of net income.
Thus instead of a single line depicting the "average" firm's expenditure at
each income level, we present a "ban" around each line representing one
standard deviation above or below the mean.
We hypothesize that profits have the greatest effect on charitable gifts
and the weakest effect on commercial transactions with civic and strategic
partnerships falling in between. Our expectations are based on the
assumption that commercial, and to a lesser extent, strategic partnerships
are part of the overall business strategy of firms and are aimed at
enhancing revenues in the short term. Thus expenditures for these
partnerships will remain relatively constant across net income levels for a
given industry and firms of a given size.
In contrast, charity, and to a lesser extent civic expenditures, benefit
the firm more indirectly or not at all and thus are more discretionary. If
the firm is performing far above industry averages, management has the
capacity and legitimacy to expend more on charity, both in absolute dollars
and as a percentage of pretax net income. If the firm is performing far
below industry averages, management will reduce their giving, both in
absolute dollars as well as a percentage of pretax net income. In the realm
of losers, giving will be minimal because management will not have the
legitimacy to spend money on things which do not benefit the firm
directly.
In Figure 2 we also argue that there is variation in levels of
expenditures at different income levels. What accounts for this variation?
First we need to differentiate among giving varieties. With respect to
civic and charitable contributions, we would hypothesize that this variation
158. See infra pp. 1088-90.
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would be explained by whether firms are managerial-controlled or ownercontrolled, or whether executives are embedded in social contexts which
are supportive of charitable and/or civic partnerships or indifferent.
Because these expenditures are not expected to reap the firm exclusive,
measurable benefits, agency conditions or community context are free to
influence firm behavior.
We further hypothesize that the effect of these factors on civic and
charitable giving will be contingent upon profit level. In other words, at
different points along the X-axis, these regressors will be better or worse
predictors of giving. For example, in the domain of high performers, we
expect that whether giving to civic or charitable organizations is above the
curve will be a function of being managerially-controlled or having
executives embedded in social contexts where giving to charity is
normatively prescribed. In the domain of poor performance, we do not
expect that either of these variables will be predictive of civic or charity
giving, given that, for no other reason, the variance in the amounts given
as charity or civic dollars will be low.
We next hypothesize that expenditures on strategic partnerships would
be a function of whether firms were highly dependent upon "natural
persons" (consumers, employees, public opinion) for their survival. Here,
firms are looking for direct benefits, although it often is difficult to
measure these benefits.
Given firms' strategic dependency upon
stakeholders, they will seek to impress others in any number of ways,
including the charitable donation. In contrast to the argument above,
however, we do not expect much variation across income levels. Since the
benefits from these expenditures are expected to be direct and to contribute
to the performance of the firm (even in the long run), expenditures will be
constant across profit levels.
Finally, we turn to commercial partnerships. Among high and low
performers, the variance in giving to strategic and commercial means
should be minimal, and we do not expect that any of the covariates we
have discussed will be of much use in explaining the variance we find.
Expenditures of this type will depend more on industry (e.g., biomedical
products, computer mainframes, etc.), historical circumstance, and
strategic opportunity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This paper showed that companies relate to the charitable sector in a
number of different ways. Some partnerships result in direct measurable
benefits to the firm, while others benefit third parties and are difficult to
evaluate. We argued that the former are acceptable to those who believe
that firms should derive direct benefit from their charity, while those who
believe in stakeholder theory will be more comfortable with the latter.
After reviewing the literature on the covariates of giving, we suggested
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that a firm's choice of "variety" will depend less on company philosophy
and more on firms' profits, market position, ownership, and social
context.
Clearly our efforts are exploratory, and empirical work needs to be
done to collect data on firms and test our hypotheses. We expect that
future research will refine our primitive efforts and proffer more
sophisticated models. Also, research is needed that would translate our
descriptive model into a set of workable guidelines which corporate
managers could use when setting their contributions budgets and planning
their community relations initiatives.
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Figure 1:-- Typology of Corporate Nonprofit Transactions
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Figure 2 - Theoretical Relationship Between Expenitures to the Charity
Sector and Net Income by Transaction Type
Graph B: Strategic Partnerships
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Figure 2 - Theoretical Relaiorship Betwcen Transaction Type,
Perfomanee, Market Position. Ownerhip, aixdCommunity Context.
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Figure 2-Theoretical Relationship Between Expensitures to the Charity
Sector and Net Income by Transaction Type
Graph D: Chartiable Panershiips
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